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Somalia has for many years been 
known as the classic example of a 
failed state and illustrates clearly 
how difficult it can be to restore state 
institutions after their total collapse. 
Prolonged civil war, famine and 
poverty have caused a humanitarian 
crisis with large flows of IDPs and an 
estimated 3.2 million people in need 
of humanitarian assistance.1 Yet while 
increasing numbers of the population 
are in urgent need 
of assistance, access 
by international 
agencies to provide 
relief has become 
more difficult 
as a result of 
pressure from 
non-state armed 
groups (NSAGs). 
Since the fall of 
Siad Barre’s regime 
in 1991 various 
self-appointed 
administrations 
have attempted to 
seize power – and 
declare autonomy 
– in different parts 
of the country. Most 
well known, though 
not internationally 
recognised, is Somaliland to the 
northwest. As humanitarian space 
has been shrinking in south-central 
Somalia, agencies have reorganised 
their operations to run from the 
relatively stable areas of Somaliland 
and, to some extent, Puntland in 
the north. Yet south-central Somalia 
remains the region where most of 
the IDPs and population in acute 
need are situated and, while the 
difficulties for humanitarian agencies 
in negotiating access with NSAGs 
in the capital city Mogadishu are 
well known, it is not representative 
for all of south-central Somalia.  
Where NSAGs form local 
administrations, they become one 
of the duty bearers towards the 
population, including IDPs. And 
when these administrations are 
viewed as legitimate among the 
population, they become important 
potential partners. In the town 
of South Galkayo, some 450 km 
north of Mogadishu, an NSAG 
called Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jamaa is 
in control. Here, in contrast to its 
experience of trying to facilitate 
safe return for IDPs to Mogadishu, 
the Danish Demining Group (DDG) 
has had a positive experience not 
only of obtaining access but also 
of engaging in partnership with 
both the communities and the 
self-appointed administration.  
A pragmatic approach
Engaging with NSAGs in building 
institutions to ensure civilian 
security can be controversial but 
can also be necessary in cases like 
Somalia where no central state power 
exists or is likely to do so in the near 
future. The prolonged civil war and 
high levels of insecurity in Somalia 
have created an urgent need for 
initiatives to reduce armed violence 
in order to create an environment 
where development can take place. 
Experience from working in South 
Galkayo supports the argument 
that the approach to stabilisation in 
Somalia needs to explore community-
driven processes rather than 
large-scale and highly politicised 
stabilisation efforts that have so far 
proven counter-productive. Building 
safety at the community level needs 
to follow humanitarian principles: 
placing the need of the population 
at the centre, while not promoting 
a political agenda. This may even 
mean engaging 
with NSAGs 
in cases where 
they have some 
legitimacy within 
the population 
and prove willing 
to adhere to 
international 
standards of 
humanitarian law. 
South Galkayo is the 
capital of Galmudug 
State, a self-declared 
administration 
founded by clan 
elders and the 
NSAG Ahlu-
Sunna Wal-Jamaa 
following the defeat 
of the Mogadishu 
warlords in 2006. 
The town of Galkayo is situated on 
the border of Puntland and south-
central Somalia and is split north 
and south under the Puntland and 
Galmudug State administrations 
respectively. Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jamaa 
is the overall security provider in 
South Galkayo and has managed 
to improve security in the area 
administrated by Galmudug State. 
Compared to other regions in 
south-central Somalia, the area 
under the control of Galmudug 
State has enjoyed relative stability 
since 2006 and has attracted people 
displaced by conflict from other 
regions. While the relationship 
between the host communities in 
South Galkayo and the IDPs has 
Non-state armed groups are often considered to lack legitimacy as 
potential counterparts in building security institutions but when they are in 
fact in control, this point of view has to be reviewed. 
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previously been good (mainly due 
to clan loyalties), the risk of tension 
is now increasing as the growing 
number of IDPs puts pressure on the 
communities’ limited resources. 
Galkayo is of great strategic 
importance as it represents one of 
the few pockets of relative stability 
in Somalia, from and in which 
international organisations can 
operate. Yet most organisations settle 
in North Galkayo under the Puntland 
administration, a move that has 
fuelled a feeling of marginalisation in 
South Galkayo. DDG is one of the few 
organisations that have explored the 
possibility of access in South Galkayo 
by starting up community safety 
programmes in two communities 
there, Dalsan and Alanley, in 2010. 
Community safety is a bottom-up 
approach to stabilisation where 
the communities themselves have 
strong ownership of the process. 
External as well as internal 
dynamics of crime, armed violence 
and clan conflict combined with 
the very limited resources within 
the communities make stability in 
South Galkayo very fragile and there 
is an urgent need for sustainable 
security solutions. Galmudug 
State is pursuing statebuilding 
goals in their region but lacks the 
capacity and resources to create 
security and development without 
external assistance – and is therefore 
actively seeking partnerships 
with international organisations. 
In contrast to al-Shabaab, Ahlu-
Sunna Wal-Jamaa does not oppose 
international agencies which receive 
funding from Western governments. 
This is partly due to the make-up 
of the NSAG, which is funded on 
clan structures rather than religious 
discourse, and partly because 
Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jamaa works in 
alliance with the Transitional Federal 
Government. DDG is working 
with Galmudug State to address 
all aspects of armed violence and 
bring together members of different 
communities to identify and develop 
solutions to their safety and security 
needs, through development and 
implementation of a community 
safety plan. Such community 
safety projects aim not only to 
improve the immediate security 
situation but also to strengthen 
the target communities’ capacity 
to resist being drawn into conflict 
and to improve any individual 
or group behaviour which might 
contribute to triggering conflict.
Community safety
More than 50% of the households 
in DDG’s two target communities 
report owning at least one firearm, 
and accidents related to small arms 
and light weapons (SALW) remain 
among the highest security concerns 
in the two communities. DDG’s 
programme involves installing 
safe storage devices2 for small arms 
and light weapons and clearing 
unexploded ordnance, and by 
providing education on the risks of 
mines and training in firearm safety 
behaviour. Another big security 
concern in Dalsan and Alanley 
is communal and clan conflict. 
Here DDG seeks to strengthen the 
communities’ capacity to manage 
conflict and find peaceful settlements 
to disputes, e.g. through conflict 
management education. As IDPs are 
new-comers to the communities, 
they often become vulnerable when 
there is conflict; strengthening the 
relationship between IDPs and the 
host communities by involving 
both groups in the community 
safety process, and thereby 
creating common ownership, is 
therefore of high importance. 
Crimes of rape, theft, assault and 
robbery are also of great concern 
within the two communities. 
Such crime can not only affect the 
safety of the population but can 
also be potentially destabilising – 
for example, by sparking revenge 
killings and conflict between clans, 
families or north/south population.3 
Traditional leaders lack the tools to 
address these new criminal trends; 
what is needed is an effective police 
force that the communities trust 
to solve crime and settle disputes. 
Galmudug State has recently trained 
325 police officers to be employed 
in South Galkayo but with 38% of 
households reporting that they 
would still go to clan leaders 
concerning a crime, rather than to 
the police, the relationship between 
police and the communities clearly 
needs to be strengthened. DDG has 
helped establish community-based 
policing committees, which function 
as a link between the two. DDG is 
also engaged in discussions with 
Galmudug State to identify other 
ways of supporting the building 
of formal security institutions, 
such as training the police force 
in human rights principles.
There are many challenges associated 
with providing capacity building 
and assistance for a police force that 
is institutionally anchored within 
an NSAG rather than a recognised 
government and this has to be done 
with certain considerations in mind. 
In the context of Galmudug State, 
the main challenges are the lack of 
capacity within the administration 
and the difficulty of stepping 
outside clan structures in order to 
build independent, accountable 
state institutions. DDG’s decision 
to engage in partnership with 
Galmudug State was possible because 
of the high level of legitimacy 
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The role of these armed groups 
and the consequences of their 
actions on the welfare of civilians 
have all been extraordinarily 
negative. Unfortunately, the 
accountability of these groups for 
civilian protection has been largely 
ignored while their notoriety has 
more to do with Western concerns 
over terrorism, piracy and security 
than the protection of civilians. 
The occasionally contradictory 
strategies employed by regional 
actors and the international 
community have so far concentrated 
on boosting the legitimacy and 
capacity of the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG); designating 
and isolating the militants as 
‘terrorist’ groups; expanding 
provision of humanitarian assistance 
even if that means working with 
networks and groups which violate 
civilians’ human rights; and 
seeking to re-establish peace and 
stability including by supporting 
the fledging African Union’s 
peacekeeping mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM). Recently, however, 
some of these actors have taken 
some steps – albeit fragmented and 
limited in scope – to focus on the 
protection of civilians including 
those uprooted from their homes. 
The ongoing conflict between groups 
such as al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam 
on the one hand and the weak TFG 
and its military allies on the other 
continues to cause the death of 
numerous civilians and to displace 
hundreds of thousands of civilians 
from their homes and livelihoods. 
For example, in January 2010 over 
25,000 civilians were displaced by 
fighting over the control of the town 
of Beledweyne in central Somalia.
While they are not the only 
guilty party, al-Shabaab has been 
particularly brazen in its use of 
civilians as human shields; recruiting 
children and young persons; 
suicide missions; attacking and 
shelling civilian areas; exacting 
extreme forms of shari’a penalties 
even for minor offences; attacking 
and intimidating journalists, 
humanitarian workers and 
peacekeepers; and imposing undue 
restrictions on humanitarian access.
The UN and other humanitarian 
organisations run their operations 
from outside Somalia, mainly 
from Kenya, relying heavily on 
nationals for the actual delivery of 
aid within Somalia. According to 
the former Special Representative 
of the Secretary General (SRSG) 
on the human rights of IDPs, 
this approach has resulted in a 
disproportionate exposure of 
local staff to danger and remains 
unsustainable in the long run. 
Though the autonomous regions 
of Somaliland and Puntland had 
been spared from some of the worst 
violations by armed groups, they are 
now increasingly being infiltrated by 
members of armed groups, triggering 
a phenomenon of forced return of 
IDPs by authorities who fear that  
al-Shabaab forces are hiding among 
For 20 years armed groups have been permanent fixtures of the conflicts 
in Somalia and have been direct participants in human rights and 
humanitarian law violations. Now there are some international moves to 
hold them to account.
Al-Shabaab’s responsibility to 
protect civilians in Somalia  
Allehone Mulugeta Abebe 
that Galmudug State and Ahlu-
Sunna Wal-Jamaa hold within the 
population, and their willingness to 
discuss human rights standards and 
international humanitarian law, a 
potential that can only be explored 
through partnership and dialogue.
Integrating armed violence 
reduction and development
Armed violence is one of the major 
obstacles to development and 
therefore development initiatives 
need to be linked to reducing armed 
violence. In an attempt to link the 
two processes, DDG and the Danish 
Refugee Council (DRC) have 
developed an integrated approach to 
Community Safety and Community 
Driven Recovery and Development. 
In South Galkayo as well as other 
places across Somalia, both DDG and 
DRC are present and, when possible, 
work alongside each other to engage 
communities to take ownership of the 
process of both improving safety and 
pursuing development goals. 
In the Somali context this integrated 
approach has been successful, 
fostering sustainable change in the 
target communities. With UNDP 
and JPLG (UN Joint Programme on 
Local Governance and Decentralised 
Service Delivery)4 exploring a similar 
integrated approach at the district 
level in Puntland and Somaliland, 
there seems to be an increasing 
international recognition that armed 
violence reduction and development 
need to go hand in hand. 
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